Donald Henry Rumsfeld /럼스펠드 보고서 원문

소개글

Donald Henry Rumsfeld /럼스펠드 보고서 원문에 대한 보고서 자료입니다.

목차

I. Charter and Organization

A. Statutory Charter of the Commission

B. Organization of the Report

II. Executive Summary

A. Conclusions of the Commissioners

B. The Commission and Its Methods

C. New Threats in a Transformed Security Environment

D. A New Non-Proliferation Environment

E. Alternative Ballistic Missile Launch Modes

F. Erosion of Warning

G. Methodology

H. Summary

본문내용

ed significant programs.
We chose to focus on what is left to be accomplished in the programs of potentially threatening ballistic missile powers and alternative paths they can follow to attain their goals. We reviewed program histories and current activities, including foreign assistance, to determine whether a ballistic missile program acquired the means to overcome its identified problems. We considered the multiple pathways available for completing its development given the combination of expertise and technology available to it and the circumstances in which it is operating. This approach accepts as a basic premise that a power determined to possess a long range missile, knowing that the U.S. is trying to track its every action but aware of American intelligence methods and sources, will do its best to deny information and to deceive the U.S. about its actual progress.
Because of these options available to emerging ballistic missile powers, the Commission, unanimously recognizing that missile development and deployment now follows new models, strongly urges the use of an expanded approach to intelligence that assesses both inputs and outputs in other countries' ballistic missile programs. We believe this approach is needed in order to capture both sooner and more accurately the speed and magnitude of potential ballistic missile proliferation in the post-Cold War world and to assess, in time, the various threats this proliferation poses to the United States.
The Commission's key judgments are derived from applying this methodology and examining the evidence in light of the individual and collective experience of the nine Commissioners.
H. Summary
Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States. This is not a distant threat. Characterizing foreign assistance as a wild card is both incorrect and misleading. Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling and often the preferred path to ballistic missile and WMD capability.
A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means of delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.
The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the U.S. and to deceive the U.S. about the pace, scope and direction of their development and proliferation programs. Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.

키워드

Donald Henry Rumsfeld ,   Rumsfeld ,   럼스펠드,   럼스팰드,   보고서,   정치,   외교,   미사일