목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 울지의 의회 보조세금 확보 전략
Ⅲ. 울지의 의회 조세 확보 전략 평가
Ⅱ. 울지의 의회 보조세금 확보 전략
Ⅲ. 울지의 의회 조세 확보 전략 평가
본문내용
s abrupt demand: Wolsey had no choice but to follow the MPs' decision as far as his financial policies were concerned; the only problem Wolsey did not solve during this Parliament was the subsidy question; and the result of Wolsey's crude manipulation was typified by his failure in getting the sum of money which he had wanted from Parliament.
In this study it is demonstrated that above interpretations are not appropriate. Wolsey's manipulation of Parliament was admirably successful. The MPs voted for his proposal and he was able to secure an amount of money with which he was satisfied. This conclusion in this study is the exact antithesis of the opinions which have usually been accepted on this subject.
Wolsey skillfully used the undeniably great cause, the war, to collect a subsidy, although, in reality, this cause was different from his real intention. He asked for a larger sum of subsidy from Parliament than he actually needed. The amount was so big that the MPs were shocked by his demand. The embarrassed MPs held a series of discussions to find a way to cut down the subsidy for which Wolsey asked. They reduced the sum to three-fourths of that Wolsey demanded. They might have been satisfied with the result. However, strictly speaking, they fell into Wolsey's trap. To him, the reduced subsidy was a sufficient amount of money. The sum of the subsidy was an unprecedented amount of money, and, from the first, he counted on the MPs reduction of his demand. Moreover, his real plan to avoid the war and to give up the repayment to the forced loan increased his satisfaction.
Wolsey controlled the MPs' opinions in various ways. He formed, intentionally or unintentionally, a group of MPs who blindly followed and supported his proposals in the parliamentary debates. He also had a certain MP promulgate his ideas. He, as the strongest man among the subjects, used his authority and power fully to manipulate Parliament. Sometimes he broke down the MPs' criticisms of the subsidy in a brutal manner and sometimes he created an atmosphere so that no MP could attempt to bring up his critical opinions on the taxation in the parliamentary debates.
Wolsey's tactics may be blameworthy because of his cunning methods of manipulating Parliament. He almost imperceptibly disguised his original schemes, such as avoiding war and giving up the repayment of the forced loans, and he did not try to realize the causes which he had used in Parliament to gain the subsidy. Nonetheless, this criticism was not voiced in 1523. His manipulation may have been a natural result of the unsystematic financial system at that time.
All interpretations on this subject that Wolsey was a crude manipulator, that he 'barely' received a small amount of subsidy, that he was an abrupt subsidy demander who considered his own desire only, and that the only problem he could not control was 'money' which caused the vigorous and partially successful opposition to Wolsey in 1523, should be reconsidered.
In this study it is demonstrated that above interpretations are not appropriate. Wolsey's manipulation of Parliament was admirably successful. The MPs voted for his proposal and he was able to secure an amount of money with which he was satisfied. This conclusion in this study is the exact antithesis of the opinions which have usually been accepted on this subject.
Wolsey skillfully used the undeniably great cause, the war, to collect a subsidy, although, in reality, this cause was different from his real intention. He asked for a larger sum of subsidy from Parliament than he actually needed. The amount was so big that the MPs were shocked by his demand. The embarrassed MPs held a series of discussions to find a way to cut down the subsidy for which Wolsey asked. They reduced the sum to three-fourths of that Wolsey demanded. They might have been satisfied with the result. However, strictly speaking, they fell into Wolsey's trap. To him, the reduced subsidy was a sufficient amount of money. The sum of the subsidy was an unprecedented amount of money, and, from the first, he counted on the MPs reduction of his demand. Moreover, his real plan to avoid the war and to give up the repayment to the forced loan increased his satisfaction.
Wolsey controlled the MPs' opinions in various ways. He formed, intentionally or unintentionally, a group of MPs who blindly followed and supported his proposals in the parliamentary debates. He also had a certain MP promulgate his ideas. He, as the strongest man among the subjects, used his authority and power fully to manipulate Parliament. Sometimes he broke down the MPs' criticisms of the subsidy in a brutal manner and sometimes he created an atmosphere so that no MP could attempt to bring up his critical opinions on the taxation in the parliamentary debates.
Wolsey's tactics may be blameworthy because of his cunning methods of manipulating Parliament. He almost imperceptibly disguised his original schemes, such as avoiding war and giving up the repayment of the forced loans, and he did not try to realize the causes which he had used in Parliament to gain the subsidy. Nonetheless, this criticism was not voiced in 1523. His manipulation may have been a natural result of the unsystematic financial system at that time.
All interpretations on this subject that Wolsey was a crude manipulator, that he 'barely' received a small amount of subsidy, that he was an abrupt subsidy demander who considered his own desire only, and that the only problem he could not control was 'money' which caused the vigorous and partially successful opposition to Wolsey in 1523, should be reconsidered.