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Many people assume that Wittgenstein’s later view of language opposed to his earlier one. Actually, both views have some difference. But we need to think whether they are opposite. I think they are not opposite, have relation. I will discuss this issue.
Wittgenstein’s theory of language in the Tractatus has two components: the ‘picture theory’ and the ‘truth-function theory’. Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth of falsity are not determined by other proposition but by the world. These he called ‘elementary proposition’. Elementary propositions are ‘logical pictures’ of atomic facts-the basic kind of facts which cannot be further analyzed- and all complex propositions are ‘truth-functions’ of the elementary ones. Propositions which don’t picture facts are nonsensical, so we have to keep silence about what transcends the world.
In Investigation, Wittgenstein says “Look at sense of sentence as its employment.” The use of language ordinarily has a point, and Wittgenstein uses term, “Language game” in order to explain this. Sentence has sense when it is used for suitable purpose.
Later Wittgenstein repudiates analytic method. He has rejected the meaningfulness of talking about the absolutely simple ‘objects’, the existence of ‘elementary propositions’, and the notion of a ‘final analysis’. Suppose someone says ‘The broom is in the corner’, does this sentence really mean ‘the broomstick is in the corner, the brush is in the corner, and the broomstick is attached to the brush’? Wittgenstein characteristically answers:
If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought especially of the broomstick or especially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying ‘Bring me the broom’, you said,
Wittgenstein’s theory of language in the Tractatus has two components: the ‘picture theory’ and the ‘truth-function theory’. Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth of falsity are not determined by other proposition but by the world. These he called ‘elementary proposition’. Elementary propositions are ‘logical pictures’ of atomic facts-the basic kind of facts which cannot be further analyzed- and all complex propositions are ‘truth-functions’ of the elementary ones. Propositions which don’t picture facts are nonsensical, so we have to keep silence about what transcends the world.
In Investigation, Wittgenstein says “Look at sense of sentence as its employment.” The use of language ordinarily has a point, and Wittgenstein uses term, “Language game” in order to explain this. Sentence has sense when it is used for suitable purpose.
Later Wittgenstein repudiates analytic method. He has rejected the meaningfulness of talking about the absolutely simple ‘objects’, the existence of ‘elementary propositions’, and the notion of a ‘final analysis’. Suppose someone says ‘The broom is in the corner’, does this sentence really mean ‘the broomstick is in the corner, the brush is in the corner, and the broomstick is attached to the brush’? Wittgenstein characteristically answers:
If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought especially of the broomstick or especially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying ‘Bring me the broom’, you said,
- 가격1,300원
- 페이지수10페이지
- 등록일2010.01.22
- 저작시기2008.12
- 파일형식워드(doc)
- 자료번호#577203
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