맨큐의 경제학
닫기
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • 11
  • 12
  • 13
  • 14
  • 15
  • 16
  • 17
  • 18
  • 19
  • 20
  • 21
  • 22
  • 23
  • 24
  • 25
  • 26
  • 27
  • 28
  • 29
  • 30
  • 31
  • 32
  • 33
  • 34
  • 35
  • 36
  • 37
  • 38
  • 39
  • 40
  • 41
  • 42
  • 43
  • 44
  • 45
  • 46
  • 47
  • 48
  • 49
  • 50
  • 51
  • 52
  • 53
  • 54
  • 55
  • 56
  • 57
  • 58
  • 59
  • 60
  • 61
  • 62
  • 63
  • 64
  • 65
  • 66
  • 67
  • 68
  • 69
  • 70
  • 71
  • 72
  • 73
  • 74
  • 75
  • 76
  • 77
  • 78
  • 79
  • 80
  • 81
  • 82
  • 83
  • 84
  • 85
  • 86
  • 87
해당 자료는 10페이지 까지만 미리보기를 제공합니다.
10페이지 이후부터 다운로드 후 확인할 수 있습니다.

소개글

맨큐의 경제학에 대한 보고서 자료입니다.

본문내용

assumption that each firm cannot realize its rival firms reaction.
(5) Stachelberg Model & Asymmetric Duopoly
Two different firms
Leader : knows that the follower will treat leader's output level as given.
Follower: does not realize its rival's output can be readjusted. (Cournot Duopolist)
- Asymmetric Duopoly
Follower's reaction function
Leader's ∏-max. Problem
Max. PQ - C
,
Leader's
Follower's
(6) Hotelling's Model & Transportation Costs
Shop A gets all the customers(beach-goers) along CD & DE. (∵ transportation cost)
Shop B gets all the customers along EF & FG.
Shop A has an incentive to move toward Shop B
→ Finally two shops will be located at the center of the beach.
→ Can explain the concentration of business in many cities.
Game - Theoretic Approach to Duopoly
*: Equilibrium
Payoff Matrix for a duopolist A
Maximum Principle A's strategy
Cut Price Keep Present Price
B's Strategy
Cut
- 60*
-80
Keep
+ 60
0
Payoff Matrix for a duopolist B
A's Strategy
Cut Keep
A's Strategy
Cut
- 80*
+ 60
Keep
- 100
0
Prisoner's Dilemma
If both confess, then each gets 10 years
If both keep quiet, then each get 2 years (evidence is weak)
If one prisoner confess but the other doesn't, then the cooperating prisoner gets 1 year whereas
the other gets 15 years.
A's Payoff
A's strategy
Confess Keep Quiet
B
Confess
- 10*
- 15
Keep Q
- 1
- 2
B's Payoff
A's strategy
Confess Keep Quiet
B
Confess
- 10*
- 1
Keep Q
- 15
- 2
Oligopoly
Sweezy's Kinked D - curve & Price rigidity
Sweezy's assumption:
If the firm raises price, the other do not lower
If the firm lowers price, the other prices too.
Is Sweezy's assumption acceptable?
- Empirical evidence does not support his assumption.
Then, why are prices sticky?
- trasportation cost associated w/ price changes.
ex) changing price tags, new advertisement, …
Collusion
All the above Oligopoly theories exclude the possibility of collusion between firms.
(1) Cartel
def. : A combination of firms whose objective is to limit the scope of competitive forces within a
market.
- usually converts oligopolistic market to monopolistic market.
ex) OPEC
Two types of Cartel
a) Perfect Cartel
The objective is to maximize .
- the same as a multiplant monopolist
MR = MC1 = MC2 = … = MCn
b) Market - sharing Cartel
- There is no centralized body that perfect cartel have.
- only set minimum price or quota
Can a cartel last long?
- There always is the possibility of cheating.
(2) Informal, Tacit Collusion
A cartel is a formal collusion, which is usually prohibited by the law. Sometimes oligopolists operates on informal collusive agreements.
Gentlemen's Agreement
- informal agreement on cooperation
Price Leadership Model
- A popular type of tacit collusions
- A dominant firm sets a price that maximize its profit, then small firms take the price
ex) McDonald (Price setter)
Wendy's
Hardeg's Price Takers
Rax
Sony TV (Price setter)
Magnovox
Panasonic Price takers
RCA
Merger
In an oligopolistic market, one firm can eliminate rivalry through merger.
  • 가격3,000
  • 페이지수87페이지
  • 등록일2010.04.23
  • 저작시기2006.5
  • 파일형식한글(hwp)
  • 자료번호#602052
본 자료는 최근 2주간 다운받은 회원이 없습니다.
청소해
다운로드 장바구니