공공선택과 의회과정

목차

I. 서론

II. 분석의 기본틀 및 가정

III. 투표절차 및 투표행태의 영향

IV. 위원회 제도의 분석

V. 결론

본문내용

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키워드

공공선택,   의회과정,   의원회제도