`미국과 독일은 왜 달라졌나
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목차

I. 서론

II. 앵글로아메리칸모델과 라인모델은 얼마나 다른가?

III. 미국과 독일의 경영자자본주의가 확립되는 역사적 배경의 차이

IV. 독일은 미국에 비해 자본시장과 소유분산이 왜 발달하지 못했나?

V. 결론

본문내용

formance in the United States and Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
O'Sullivan, M. (1998), Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges, Public Policy Brief, no. 49, Jerome Levy Economics Institute.
OECD (1995), OECD Economic Surveys: Germany.
OECD (1998), OECD Economic Surveys: United Kingdom.
Pistor, K. (1999), "Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities," in Blair and Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate Governance, Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institute Press.
Porter, G. (1992), The Rise of Big Business, 1860-1920, 손영호·연동원 역, 『미국기업사』, 학문사, 1998.
Prowse, S. (1995), "Corporate Governance in an International Perspective: A Survey of Corporate Control Mechanisms among Large Firms in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany," Financial Market, Institutions and Instruments, Vol. 4: 1∼63.
Roe, M. J. (1997), "Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems," in Hopt and Wymeersch, eds.
Roe, M. J. (1999), "Codetermination and German Securities Markets," in Blair and Roe, eds. Employees and Corporate Governance, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.
Roe, M. J. (2000), "Political Precondition to Separation Ownership from Corporate Control," The Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 155, Columbia Law School.
Roe, M. J. (2001a), "The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization", Public Law Working Paper No. 019, Harvard Law School.
Roe, M. J. (2001b), "Rents and their Corporate Consequences", The Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 184, Columbia Law School.
Schmidt, H., et al. (1997), Corporate Governance in Germany, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Schroder, U. and A. Schrader (1998), "The Changing Role of Banks and Corporate Governance in Germany: Evolution towards the Market?," in Black and Moersch, eds.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1997), "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance vol. 52, no. 2, June.
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Smith, E. O. (1994), The German Economy, London/New York: Routledge.
Streeck, W. (1997), "German Capitalism: Does it Exit? Can it Survive?," New Political Economy Vol. 2, No. 2.
Vitols, S. (2000), "The reconstrucion of German corporate governance: Reassessing the role of capital market pressures", first anual meeting of the research network on corporate governance, Berlin.
Wenger, E. and C. Kaserer (1998), "The German System of Corporate Governance―A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated," in Black and Moersch, eds.
Windolf, P. (2000), "The Structure of Corporate Governance: A six country comparison", Paper presented on the first workshop of the Research Network on Corporate Governance Network, June, www.wz-berlin.de/wb/cogo_net/default_cogo.en.htm.
Yoshimori, M. (1995), "Whose Company Is It? The Concept of Corporation in Japan and the West", Long Range Planning, Vol. 28: 33∼44.

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  • 가격3,300
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  • 등록일2002.07.06
  • 저작시기2002.07
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