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목차
Introduction
The transformation of the East Asian strategic order
The distinctive characteristics of the East Asian Economic
The China’s role in East Asia of Future
World power, Regional power and Strategic interests
The United States and East Asia after Cold-War
The Soviet Union(Russia) and East Asia after the Cold-War
The transformation of the East Asian strategic order
The distinctive characteristics of the East Asian Economic
The China’s role in East Asia of Future
World power, Regional power and Strategic interests
The United States and East Asia after Cold-War
The Soviet Union(Russia) and East Asia after the Cold-War
본문내용
The United States and East Asia after Cold-War
In the 1980s, when Vietnam had and army of 180,000 in Cambodia and clashed with Thai troops several times in border skirmishes although Washington remained formally committed by the Manila Treaty to war in a big enough way to save the country. The pretense served by a token presence and symbolic commitment can continue, but I scarcely matter unless a test comes. Southeast Asia in the part of East Asia where U.S. military engagement appears to be least likely, although Washington has disconcerting habit of going to war in places it had not anticipated or indeed in places East Asia is also where diplomacy to improve the balance of power is impeded by visceral American bitterness over the fruitless war there two decades ago. By balance of power criteria, the United States could have repaired relations with Vietnam. Although Vietnam cannot be expected to contain China on its own. There is no strategic reason anymore to keep Hanoi weak. Since Vietnam is no longer and extension of Soviet power and influence, no longer occupies Cambodia has demobilized half of its huge army, has moved to liberalize its economy and its polity and faces China on its northern border. This is why Vietnam would change in the unlikely event that Hanoi decided to reoccupy Cambodia.
Despite realist is not totally unaccustomed to dumping friends and embracing bitter enemies for balance of power purposes. The relations between U.S. and Japan , since it implies moving away from end of Cold-War.
In the 1980s, when Vietnam had and army of 180,000 in Cambodia and clashed with Thai troops several times in border skirmishes although Washington remained formally committed by the Manila Treaty to war in a big enough way to save the country. The pretense served by a token presence and symbolic commitment can continue, but I scarcely matter unless a test comes. Southeast Asia in the part of East Asia where U.S. military engagement appears to be least likely, although Washington has disconcerting habit of going to war in places it had not anticipated or indeed in places East Asia is also where diplomacy to improve the balance of power is impeded by visceral American bitterness over the fruitless war there two decades ago. By balance of power criteria, the United States could have repaired relations with Vietnam. Although Vietnam cannot be expected to contain China on its own. There is no strategic reason anymore to keep Hanoi weak. Since Vietnam is no longer and extension of Soviet power and influence, no longer occupies Cambodia has demobilized half of its huge army, has moved to liberalize its economy and its polity and faces China on its northern border. This is why Vietnam would change in the unlikely event that Hanoi decided to reoccupy Cambodia.
Despite realist is not totally unaccustomed to dumping friends and embracing bitter enemies for balance of power purposes. The relations between U.S. and Japan , since it implies moving away from end of Cold-War.
추천자료
- 가격700원
- 페이지수5페이지
- 등록일2010.01.29
- 저작시기2008.7
- 파일형식워드(doc)
- 자료번호#579046
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